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ALIENS IN THE FEDERAL CIVIL SERVICE
From its inception, our Nation welcomed and drew strength from the
immigration of aliens. Their contributions to the social and economic life
of the country were self-evident . . ..
The preceding statement of Mr. Justice Powell reflects the Supreme
Court's increasingly vigorous action to assure equality of opportunity for
alien residents of the United States.2 Following this trend, in Hampton
v. Mow Sun Wong3 the Court recently held invalid the Civil Service
Commission's regulation excluding aliens from employment in the fed-
eral civil service.4 Speaking for the Court, Mr. Justice Stevens declared
that the interests of foreign policy and national security, which had been
invoked to justify the exclusionary policy, were not proper concerns of
the Civil Service Commission and thus could not provide a basis for the
agency's maintenance of the restriction.' However, the Court assumed,
without deciding, that the power of Congress or the President to control
alien affairs, national security, and foreign policy would support an
express determination by either branch to exclude aliens from federal
employment.'
1. In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 719 (1973). In this case, the Supreme Court invalidated
as a denial of equal protection the Connecticut court rule restricting admission to the bar
to United States citizens.
2. See note 25 infra.
3. 426 U.S. 88 (1976).
4. The pertinent Civil Service Commission regulation, 5 C.F.R. § 338.101(a), (b) (1976),
provides in part:
(a) A person may be admitted to competitive examination only if he is a citizen
of or owes permanent allegiance to the United States.
(b) A person may be given appointment only if he is a citizen of or owes perma-
nent allegiance to the United States.
Mow Sun Wong could not qualify for civil service employment on the basis of his
"permanent allegiance to the United States," since a "person who owes permanent alle-
giance to the United States" includes only natives of American Samoa. Brief for Petition-
ers at 81 n.67, Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976).
5. 426 U.S. at 116-17. This case represented Mr. Justice Stevens' maiden efforts on the
Supreme Court, and apparently his was the decisive vote in the 5-4 decision. 53
INTERPRM'ER RELEAsEs 162 (June 7, 1976).
6. In Mow Sun Wong, the government advanced the arguments that the exclusion of
aliens was justified by an interest in providing an incentive for aliens to become natural-
ized, by allowing the President to use the possibility of employment in the civil service as
a bargaining token, and by the need to have loyal employees in sensitive positions. 426
U.S. at 104-05. The Court stated:
[Tihe need for undivided loyalty in certain sensitive positions clearly justifies a
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In response to this decision, President Ford issued an executive order
prohibiting the employment of aliens in the federal civil service, except
as authorized when necessary to promote the efficiency of the service.7
In his letter to the Speaker of the House and the President of the Senate
accompanying the order, the President did not identify the specific na-
tional interest on which he based his decision. He simply concluded:
[I]t is in the national interest to preserve the long-standing policy of
generally prohibiting the employment of aliens from positions in the
competitive service . . .. [l]t would be detrimental to the efficiency
of the civil service, as well as contrary to the national interest, precipi-
tously to employ aliens in the competitive service without an appropriate
determination that it is in the national interest to do so.8
In the President's view, whether any federal employment of aliens would
further the national interest was an issue to be determined by Congress,
the branch primarily responsible for alien affairs
citizenship requirement in at least some parts of the federal service ....
... We may assume... that if the Congress or the President had expressly
imposed the citizenship requirement, it would be justified by the national interest




[Aissuming without deciding that the national interests identified by the peti-
tioners would adequately support an explicit determination by Congress or the
President to exclude all noncitizens from the federal service, we conclude that
those interests cannot provide an acceptable rationalization for such a determina-
tion by the Civil Service Commission.
Id. at 116 (emphasis added).
7. Exec. Order No. 11,935, 41 Fed. Reg. 37301 (1976). The text of the Order states, in
pertinent part:
(a) No person shall be admitted to competitive examination unless such person
is a citizen or national of the United States.
(b) No person shall be given any appointment in the competitive service unless
such person is a citizen or national of the United States.
c) The Commission may, as an exception to this rule and to the extent permit-
ted by law, authorize the appointment of aliens to positions in the competitive
service when necessary to promote the efficiency of the service in specific cases
or for temporary appointments.
The President's Order did not modify the regulation at issue in Mow Sun Wong, but
instead added a new section to the statute: 5 C.F.R. § 7.4 (1976).
8. Letter from the President to the Speaker of the House and to the President of the
Senate, Sept. 2, 1976, reprinted in 12 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES. Doc. 1302 (1976).
9. Id. at 1303:
In this regard, I am mindful that the Congress has the primary responsibility
with respect to the admission of aliens into, and the regulaton of the conduct of
aliens within, the United States.
While I am exercising the constitutional and statutory authority vested in me
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As the President recognized, his Executive order does not conclu-
sively resolve the issue of whether aliens should be excluded from the
federal civil service.' 0 Furthermore, the Court specifically abstained
from deciding the constitutionality of such a Presidential or congres-
sional mandate." Indeed, Justice Stevens' opinion was fully supported
by only two other Justices, and a majority was obtained by the con-
currence of Justices Brennan and Marshall,'2 who joined the opinion
only with "the understanding that there are reserved the equal protec-
tion questions that would be raised by congressional or Presidential
enactment of a bar on employment of aliens by the Federal Govern-
ment."'3 Thus, neither the Court nor the President undertook to identify
the overriding national interests which could justify the exclusion of
aliens from the federal civil service." This Note will analyze the various
national interests which have been advanced in support of the exclusion,
and will discuss the possible alternative responses of Congress' and the
courts to the President's Order" which will best protect both the na-
tional interests and the rights of aliens.
as President, a recognition of the specific constitutional authority vested in the
Congress prompts me to urge that the Congress promptly address these issues.
The Supreme Court has affirmed congressional supremacy over alien affairs:
The power of Congress to exclude aliens altogether. . . or to prescribe the terms
and conditions upon which they may come to this country, and to have its de-
clared policy in that regard enforced exclusively through executive officers, with-
out judicial intervention, is settled by our previous adjudications.
Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 766 (1972), citing Lem Moon Sing v. United States,
158 U.S. 538, 547 (1895). In addition, the exclusive power of Congress to prescribe the
terms and conditions of entry includes the power to regulate aliens in various ways once
they are here. See Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 69-70 (1941).
10. Letter from the President, supra note 8, at 1303. "By his Executive Order, the
President has now exercised the authority, heretofore found permissible but lacking by
the Court, and has invited Congress to exercise its authority to determine what exceptions
should be made to the general rule barring aliens from federal employment." 53
INTERPRETER RELEASES 297 (Sept. 10, 1976).
11. "We proceed to a consideration of that question, assuming, without deciding, that
the Congress and the President have the constitutional power to impose the requirement
that the Commission has adopted." 426 U.S. at 114 (emphasis added). See note 6 supra.
12. Justices Stevens, Stewart, Powell, Marshall, and Brennan formed the majority.
Justice Rehnquist's dissenting opinion was joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices
White and Blackmun.
13. 426 U.S. at 117.
14. See notes 7 & 8 supra and accompanying text.
15. See note 10 supra.
16. See note 7 supra.
1977]
Cornell International Law Journal
BACKGROUND
Before determining the national interests which would permit the
exclusion of aliens from the civil service, it is necessary to examine the
extent to which each branch of government exercises authority over
alien affairs, national security, and federal personnel.
The roles of Congress and the President in these areas are not clearly
delineated. While Congress exercises primary authority over alien af-
fairs and national security,'7 it has delegated much of its power to the
Executive,"5 who already holds broad constitutional powers in these
areas.'9 Similarly, congressional control of the civil service" has been
largely delegated to the President' and the Civil Service Commission."
17. Congressional authority over alien affairs rests on its control over immigration and
naturalization. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. Its authority over national security is derived
from its war powers, U.S CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11; its power to govern and regulate the
armed forces. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 14; and its power to suppress insurrections and
repel invasions, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 15.
18. See Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 66 Stat. 185, 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (1975);
National Security Act of 1947, 61 Stat. 496, 50 U.S.C. § 402 (1970).
19. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1, states: "The President shall be Commander in Chief
of the Army and Navy of the United States. . . ." Section 2, cl. 2 states: "He shall have
Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties . .. ."
Section 3 provides: "[HI]e shall receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers. . ....
20. 5 U.S.C. § 3101 (1970) provides: "Each Executive agency . . . may employ such
number of employees. . . as Congress may appropriate for from year to year."
21. 5 U.S.C. § 3301 (1970) provides:
The President may -
(1) prescribe such regulations for the admission of individuals into the
civil service in the executive branch as will best promote the efficiency
of that service;
(2) ascertain the fitness of applicants as to age, health, character,
knowledge, and ability for the employment sought; and
(3) appoint and prescribe the duties of individuals to make inquiries for
the purpose of this section.
It should be noted that Congress did not authorize the President to require citizenship as
a basis for employment.
22. 5 U.S.C. § 1301 (1970) stipulates: "The Civil Service Commission shall aid the
President, as he may request, in preparing the rules he prescribes under this title for the
administration of the competitive service." The President's power over government em-
ployees has been further delegated to the Civil Service Commission through Executive
Orders. The basis of 5 C.F.R. § 338.101 (1976), the regulation held invalid in Mow Sun
Wong, is found in Exec. Order No. 10,577, § 2.1(a), 3 C.F.R. § 218 (1954), 5 U.S.C. § 3301
(1970), which states:
The Commission is authorized to establish standards with respect to citizenship,
age, education, training and experience, suitability, and physical and mental
fitness, and for residence or other requirements which applicants must meet to
be admitted to or rated in examinations.
[Vol. 10:255
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The judiciary has been reluctant to limit executive power over
external affairs of national security, i.e. those involving foreign rela-
tions.23 Furthermore, in matters concerning alien affairs and internal
national security, courts have hesitated to disturb some administrative
decisions, stating that they are "political questions," thereby exempt
from judicial intervention. 24 The Supreme Court, however, has not re-
frained from scrutinizing and invalidating direct legislative expressions
of state discrimination against aliens in employment. 25 For example, in
Graham v. Richardson,6 in holding that the denial of welfare benefits
to noncitizens violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment, the Court established that any classification based on al-
ienage is "suspect" and subject to close judicial scrutiny under equal
23. In Oetjen v. Central Leather, 246 U.S. 297, 302 (1918), the Court affirmed: "The
conduct of the foreign relations ... is committed by the Constitution to the Executive
. ... [Tihe exercise of this political power is not subject to judicial inquiry or decision."
More recently, in a decision involving the CIA's classification of documents in the interest
of national security, the Court of Appeals stated: "Gathering intelligence information and
the other activities of the Agency, including clandestine affairs against other nations, are
all within the President's constitutional responsibility .... [Intelligence operations]
are an executive function beyond the control of the judicial power." United States v.
Marchetti, 466 F.2d 1309, 1315, 1317 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1063 (1972). The
Supreme Court has, however, restrained the President's power over national security when
internal action is involved. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579
(1952).
24. In Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972), a waiver of the statutory exclusion
of an alien was sought by those who wished to invite him to speak in the United States.
The Court held that where a legitimate and bona fide reason exists for the executive
branch's refusal to waive the exclusion, the courts would not look behind the decision,
even to weigh it against the first amendment interests of those citizens who wished to hear
the alien speak. But see the analysis of the political question doctrine in Baker v. Carr,
369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962): "[I]t is error to suppose that every case or controversy which
touches foreign relations lies beyond judicial cognizance." See also Jalil v. Hampton, 460
F.2d 923, 925 n.1 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 887 (1972) (where the district court
noted that the question of an alien's exclusion from the civil service is not so purely
political as to preclude a judicial determination of the rights of the parties).
25. Nearly one hundred years ago, the Court realized that equal protection of the
fourteenth amendment was not confined to citizens. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356
(1886). The right to work for a living in the common occupations of the community was
recognized as the very essence of personal freedom which could not be denied to aliens.
Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915). Doubt was cast on the "proprietary interest rationale"
as a basis for the exclusion of aliens from particular occupations. Takahashi v. Fish &
Game Comm., 334 U.S. 410 (1948). State classifications based on alienage are inherently
suspect and subject to close judicial scrutiny. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
A state could not exclude aliens from the practice of law. In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717
(1973). Denial to aliens of certain classes of state civil service employment was not justi-
fied by the "special public interest," see note 29 infra, the mobility of aliens, or a state's
interest in defining its political community. Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973).
126. 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
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protection analysis.Y The Court applied the Graham rationale to the
exclusion of aliens from the competitive class of state civil service em-
ployment in Sugarman v. Dougall,2s where it held that neither the
"special public interest" doctrine 2  nor the allegation that aliens are
more likely to remain only temporarily in their positions justified a
classification excluding noncitizens from employment."0
While in accord with the judicial trend of expanding the equal em-
ployment opportunities of aliens, opening government service to aliens
was unprecedented.3' Sugarman recognized, however, that "citizenship
[may bear] some rational relationship to the special demands of [a]
particular position,"" and that compelling state interests could justify
a narrowly drawn restriction on the employment of aliens.3 The same
reservation - that aliens may be denied employment if the exclusion is
founded on compelling state interests - qualifies the Mow Sun Wong
decision.
Mow Sun Wong was one of five Chinese residents of San Francisco,
who in 1970 commenced a class action against the Civil Service Com-
mission and the heads of the three federal agencies which had denied
them employment because of their alienage .3 Claiming that the denial
of federal employment violated their rights under the due process clause
27. Id. at 371-72.
28. 413 U.S. 634 (1973).
29. Id. at 645. In People v. Crane, 214 N.Y. 154, 108 N.E. 427, afl'd sub nom. New York
v. Crane, 239 U.S. 195 (1915), Mr. Justice Cardozo upheld the New York restriction of
employment on public works to citizens on the grounds that the "special public interest"
doctrine allowed restriction of the state's resources to its own members. Under this doc-
trine, government employment is considered a privilege rather than a right and as such
may be dependent upon citizenship because public resources may be confined to citizens.
30. 413 U.S. at 645.
31. In practically every nation, aliens may not obtain employment in the career civil
service. A. ROTH, THE MINIMUM STANDARD OF INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLIED TO ALIENS 151-
54 (1949). International standards only impose a test of reasonableness upon alien restric-
tions, and restrictions upon economic opportunities to promote a legitimate national
interest are not unusual. 11 HARv. INT'L L.J. 228, 233, 235 n.32 (1970). See generally G.
BURGESS, HANDBOOK OF CIVIL SERVICE LAws AND PRACTICES (1966).
32. 413 U.S. at 647.
33. Id. at 648-49.
34. The federal agencies involved were the Post Office, the General Services Adminis-
tration, and the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, none of which is primarily
responsible for alien affairs, national security, or foreign policy. See note 46 infra. In 1971,
the Postal Service was removed from the jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission, and
in 1974, without any additional statutory authority or direction, it amended its regulation
to make all aliens who had been admitted for permanent residence eligible for all Postal
Service positions except those at a high executive level or those designated as sensitive.
Therefore, the Postal Service did not join in defending the Civil Service Commission
regulation. 426 U.S. at 97-98.
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of the fifth amendment, the aliens sought declaratory and injunctive
relief. 5 The district court held that the exclusion was constitutional
and that the federal government need only demonstrate a rational basis
for denying employment to aliens:
It is quite rational and reasonable for the Executive, via a grant of power
from the Legislature, to determine that the formation of policy and its
execution, at whatever level, should be entrusted only to United States
citizens. Moreover, as an alternative rational basis . . . the Executive
may intend that the economic security of its citizens be served by the
reservation of competitive civil service positions to them, rather than to
aliens."
While the appeal was pending, the Supreme Court invalidated state
restrictions on the employment of noncitizens in the Sugarman case."
Recognizing that Sugarman was not controlling because the fourteenth
amendment's restrictions on state powers were not directly applicable
to the federal government,-" the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
concluded nonetheless that the federal regulation in issue in Mow Sun
Wong was invalid because it "sweeps indiscriminately excluding all
aliens from all positions requiring the competitive Civil Service exami-
nation." 9 The court accepted the argument that citizenship might be a
proper requirement for positions involving policy making or national
security interests, but refused to support a universal citizenship require-
ment on those grounds."
Before the Supreme Court, the Civil Service Commission argued that
no justification for the restriction was necessary because the exercise of
federal power over aliens was not subject to the demands of equal pro-
tection. Alternatively, the Commission claimed that the fifth amend-
ment imposed only a slight burden of justification, which it had met.'
35. The plaintiffs also claimed that the restriction of federal employment to citizens
violated Exec. Order No. 11,478, 3 C.F.R. § 133 (1965), which forbids discrimination in
federal employment on the basis of "national origin." The district court held that this
order referred only to discrimination among citizens. 333 F. Supp. 527, 530 (N.D. Cal.
1971); 426 U.S. at 93.
36. 333 F. Supp. at 532. The argument of protection of economic security was invalida-
ted by the rejection of the "special public interest doctrine." See note 29 supra.
37. Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973). In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973),
holding that a state may not refuse aliens the right to practice law, was decided on the
same day.
38. "[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (emphasis added).
39. 500 F.2d 1031, 1037 (9th Cir. 1974).
40. Id. at 1040; 426 U.S. at 96.
41. 426 U.S. at 99. See note 6 supra for the interests which the government deemed
sufficient to justify the exclusion of aliens from the federal civil service.
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The Court answered that ineligibility for employment in a major sector
of the economy was a deprivation of an interest in liberty which violated
the equal protection concepts of the fifth amendment and agreed with
the respondents that some judicial scrutiny of that deprivation was
constitutionally mandated.2
Nevertheless, affirming the Court of Appeals' ruling that Sugarman
was not controlling, the Supreme Court stated:
[O]verriding national interests may provide a justification for a citizen-
ship requirement in the federal service even though an identical require-
ment may not be enforced by a State. 3
However, after examining congressional and Presidential treatment of
the issue, the Court found that neither branch had ever explicitly ex-
cluded aliens from the civil service nor identified an interest which
would justify the exclusion." Moreover, in promulgating the regulation
in issue, the Civil Service Commission had concerned itself exclusively
with the promotion of an efficient federal service and not with any
interests which might support such a restriction on alien employment."
Consequently, the regulation was deemed invalid on the theory that any
rule which deprived a class of the important liberty of eligibility for
federal employment must be made directly by Congress or the Presi-
dent, or by an agency specifically authorized to protect a predominant
national interest.4 6
42. 426 U.S. at 102-03. The Supreme Court phrased its decision in terms of procedural
due process rather than equal protection, which prompted Justice Rehnquist to argue in
his dissenting opinion that the majority "inexplicably melds together the concepts of
equal protection and procedural and substantive due process." Id. at 119.
43. Id. at 101.
44. Id. at 105.
45. The Court held that "administrative convenience" was not a valid basis for the
exclusion, although it fell properly within the scope of the Civil Service Commission's
authority. The administrative desirability of a simple exclusionary rule, where citizenship
is a valid requirement for some positions, did not provide a rational basis for the general
exclusion because the Civil Service Commission did not show that it had ever evaluated
the relative desirability of an exclusionary rule vis-A-vis the value of increasing the pool
of eligible employees. Id. at 114-16.
46. 426 U.S. at 116-17. In the opinion, the Court implies that agencies responsible for
foreign affairs, treaty negotiations, immigration or naturalization could conclude that the
furtherance of those interests required the restriction of federal employment to citizens:
"It is the business of the Civil Service Commission to adopt and enforce regulations which
will best promote the efficiency of the federal civil service. That agency has no responsibil-
ity for foreign affairs, for treaty negotiations, for establishing immigration quotas or condi-
tions of entry, or for naturalization policies." Id. at 114. In addition, the Court stated:
"[Dlue process requires that the decision to impose that deprivation of an important
liberty be made either at a comparable level of government . . . [i.e., the President or
Congress] or, if it is to be permitted to be made by the Civil Service Commission, that it
be justified by reasons which are properly the concern of that agency." Id. at 116.
[Vol. 10:25
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In holding the exclusionary rule invalid, the Court carefully avoided
the implication that any congressional or Presidential decision to re-
strict civil service employment to citizens would be constitutionally
permissible." Indeed, the Court indicated that such a decision at least
required an identification of the national interests supporting it in order
to provide a reference for judicial examination.48 Instead of responding
to Mow Sun Wong's open question of defining the overriding national
interests which justify the exclusion of aliens from federal employment,
President Ford's Order and explanatory letter merely present Congress
with the problem of ascertaining and protecting these interests. 9
II
OPEN QUESTIONS OF MOW SUN WONG
In Mow Sun Wong, the Supreme Court suggested three justifications
for the exclusion of aliens from the federal civil service: the President's
interest in preserving a "bargaining token" of offering employment op-
portunities to citizens of a given foreign country in exchange for recipro-
cal concessions, the interest in offering aliens an incentive to qualify for
naturalization and thereby participate more effectively in our society,
and the need for undivided loyalty in certain sensitive positions."z Since
the Court only assumed that these interests would support a citizenship
requirement, the adoption of any one of these concerns by Congress or
the President as a basis for exclusion would undoubtedly be subject to
further judicial scrutiny to determine whether that interest outweighed
the alien's right of equal access to federal employment.5 '
While some statutes do condition equal treatment of an alien upon
reciprocal treatment of American citizens by the alien's own country,5
47. See note 11 supra.
48. As the Court stressed: "[Ilneligibility for employment in a major sector of the
economy - is of sufficient significance to be characterized as a deprivation of an interest
in liberty .... [S]ome judicial scrutiny of the deprivation is mandated by the Constitu-
tion." 426 U.S. at 102-03. Despite the Court's statement that "[i]f the rule were expressly
mandated by the Congress or the President, we might presume that any interest which
might rationally be served by the rule did in fact give rise to its adoption," id. at 103, the
necessity for judicial scrutiny of the exclusion of aliens from the civil service would seem
to require that the national interest supporting the rule at least be identifiable.
49. See notes 7, 8, & 9 supra and accompanying text.
50. See note 6 supra and accompanying text.
51. See text accompanying note 13 supra.
52. See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. § 7435(a) (1970):
If the laws, customs, or regulations of any foreign country deny the privilege of
leasing public lands to citizens or corporations of the United States, citizens of
that foreign country, or corporations controlled by citizens of that foreign country,
may not ... acquire or own any interest in, or right to any benefit from, any lease
of land in the ... naval fuel reserves ....
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most nations do not employ aliens in their civil service agencies. 3 Gener-
ally, an alien who leaves his homeland to seek employment in the
United States often severs his ties to his own country. That nation,
therefore, may see little need to grant reciprocal advantages to Ameri-
can citizens to protect the benefits of its citizens who are unlikely to
return home." Furthermore, in view of the applicable policies of interna-
tional law, it is unlikely that foreign nations will allow Americans to
work for their government services, regardless of a restriction or lack of
restriction on the employment of their nationals in the American civil
service.5
If the President were to exclude aliens from the civil service because
of the need for such a bargaining token, the Supreme Court would be
faced with the choice of deferring to the President's acknowledged su-
premacy in this area, 5 or scrutinizing the exclusion under the equal
protection doctrine. 57 Moreover, such a Presidential decision may
See also 28 U.S.C. § 2502(a) (1970):
Citizens or subjects of any foreign government which accords to citizens of the
United States the right to prosecute claims against their government in its courts
may sue the United States in the Court of Claims if the subject matter of the suit
is otherwise within the court's jurisdiction.
53. "Restrictions upon the economic opportunities of aliens, if imposed prospectively
and pursuant to a legitimate interest of a country, are generally regarded as unexceptional
in international law." 11 HARv. INT'L L.J. 228, 233 (1970).
54. Most immigrants are admitted to the United States because they have relatives
already here; this provides them with an additional impetus to remain permanently in
this country. See generally Abrams & Abrams, Immigration Policy - Who Gets In and
Why?, 38 THE PUBLIC INTEREST 3 (1975).
55. Under international law, the obligations due by the alien to his national state
operate as a limit on the grant of political rights by the resident state. An alien generally
cannot practice professions or occupations which require an oath of allegiance (i.e., civil
service jobs). E. BORCHARD, DIPLOMATIC PROTECTION OF CrTszENs ABROAD § 24a (1915). In
addition, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which embodies principles of cus-
tomary international law, merely emphasizes that everyone has the right to participate
in and benefit from government and public service in his own country:
(1) Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his own country,
directly or through freely chosen representatives.
(2) Everyone has the right of equal access to public service in his own country.
UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTs, G.A. Res. 217, U.N. Doc. A/810 at 71 (1948).
56. See note 23 supra.
57. See text accompanying note 13 supra. The Supreme Court's decision in Baker v.
Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), provides guidelines for determining whether a question is
excluded from judicial review as a political question:
In determining whether a question falls within [the political question] category,
the appropriateness under our system of government of attributing finality to the
action of the political departments and also the lack of satisfactory criteria for a
judicial determination are dominant considerations. Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S.
433, 454-55. The nonjusticiability of a political question is primarily a function
[Vol. 10:255
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conflict with congressional authority to regulate alien affairs." Since the
President's interest in preserving a "bargaining token" is at best a weak
one in terms of its impact on foreign policy, it would probably fail to
support the exclusion of aliens if weighed against the strong
congressional interest in controlling alien affairs and the stronger consti-
tutional interest of protecting the individual rights of aliens.
It can be argued that the reservation of federal employment for citi-
zens will encourage aliens to become naturalized citizens, and that as
such they will be better equipped to contribute to American society.59
Because of his unfamiliarity with the social and political mores and
institutions of the country, an alien may not function as effectively in
government as a citizen." On the other hand, he may provide advanta-
geous outside input into federal decision making, particularly where
specialized scientific and cultural knowledge is desired." Since transfu-
of the separation of powers. Much confusion results from the capacity of the
"political question" label to obscure the need for case-by-case inquiry. Deciding
whether a matter has in any measure been committed by the Constitution to
another branch of government, or whether the action of that branch exceeds
whatever authority has been committed, is in itself a delicate exercise in constitu-
tional interpretation, and is a responsibility of this Court as ultimate interpreter
of the Constitution.
369 U.S. at 210-11. In Jalil v. Hampton, 460 F.2d 923 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
887 (1972), the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia relied on the analysis of the
political question doctrine in Baker and determined that the question of an alien's exclu-
sion from the civil service is not so purely political as to preclude a judicial determination
of the rights of the parties.
58. See note 9 supra.
59. "Congress provided that aliens seeking citizenship status prove what citizens of
birth are, as a class, presumed to understand: a basic familiarity with our social and
political mores and institutions. The naturalized citizen has demonstrated both the will-
ingness and ability to integrate into our social system as a whole ... " Dissenting
opinion of Justice Rehnquist in Sugarman, 413 U.S. at 661-62.
60. Cf. dissenting opinion of Justice Rehnquist in Sugarman, 413 U.S. at 660. In their
brief, the Appellants presented an additional argument for the exclusion: "In contrast to
citizens, the alien owes primary allegiance to the country of his nationality, and must
honor the obligations that country places on its nationals abroad." Brief for Appellants
at 10, Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973).
61. Leading American scientists concluded that the restrictive American visa policy of
the 1950's, limiting the right of foreign scientists freely to engage in teaching and research,
actually hurt the continuing advance of American science. 11 BULL. ATOMC SCMNTiST 367-
73 (Dec. 1955). The effect of the priority given to immigrants who are professionals has
helped alleviate some shortages of skilled professionals, notably physicians, in this coun-
try. However, this development also has detriments:
A readily available source of trained professionals from other countries may slow
the development of domestic talents and the expansion of training facilities.
While this importation of talent may be economical for the United States, it is
not fair either to the foreign countries that educate the professionals or to our own
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sion of new talent from the private sector into the public service is
generally encouraged, any restriction on access to the civil service will
only promote stagnation within its ranks.2 In addition, offering federal
employment as an incentive to naturalization may compel an alien to
seek citizenship, not from a desire to participate fully in American so-
ciety, but for purely economic reasons. 3
The third interest suggested in Mow Sun Wong as a possible justifica-
tion for the exclusion of aliens from the federal civil service is that of
national security. This national interest has been labeled as the need for
undivided loyalty in certain sensitive positions where the "occupant
• . .could bring about, by virtue of the nature of the position, a material
adverse effect on the national security.""
The meaning of the term "national security" is not clear, and most
of the confusion stems from various legislative, administrative, and ju-
dicial attempts to define the term." It may be broadly defined as the
government's capacity to defend itself from violent overthrow as well as
the ability of the government to function effectively.66 The Department
citizens - particularly those minority groups and women whose access to profes-
sional training and economic advancement has been limited.
Abrams & Abrams, supra note 54, at 11.
62. Restrictions on access to the civil service .. .affect an important question
of policy, the degree to which lateral movement of staff between the civil service,
the state economic enterprises and the private sector of the economy should be
tolerated or encouraged . . . .In the United States injections of talent from the
private sector into the civil service have been encouraged as a counter to over-
protection of mediocrity.
G. BURGESS, HANDBOOK OF CIVIL SERVICE LAWS AND PRAcrcEs 429 (1966).
63. Note, Constitutionality of Restrictions on Aliens' Right to Work, 57 COLUM. L. REV.
1012, 1028 (1957). It is now estimated that only half of all immigrants join the labor force.
Abrams & Abrams, supra note 54, at 19-20. However, access to the large federal job market
may encourage more resident aliens to look for work and induce visitors to begin work and
await adjustment of status from visitor to permanent resident. During the period of
adjustment, such a worker would be an "illegal alien." Id. at 22.
64. 32 C.F.R. § 156.5(c) (1976). This is the definition of a sensitive position applied by
the Defense Department in its hiring decisions.
65. For example, the term is not explicitly defined in the principal legislation concern-
ing the matter, the National Security Act of 1947, 50 U.S.C. § 401-06 (1970).
66. 'National security' is not a term of art with a precise, analytic meaning. At
its core the phrase refers to the government's capacity to defend itself from violent
overthrow by domestic subversion or external aggression. But it also encompasses
simply the ability of the government to function effectively . . . at home and
abroad. Virtually any government program, from military procurement to high-
way construction and education, can be justified in part as protecting the national
security.
85 HARv. L. REv. 1130, 1133 (1972). Case law definitions of national security are often very
broad. In Ramos v. United States Civil Service Commission, 376 F. Supp. 361, 367 n.9
(D.C.P.R. 1974), modified, 426 U.S. 916 (1976), a sensitive position is defined as one where
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of Defense narrowly defines national security as referring "to those ac-
tivities which are directly related to the protection of the military, eco-
nomic, and productive strength of the United States, including the pro-
tection of the Government in domestic and foreign affairs, against espio-
nage, sabotage, subversion, and any other illegal acts which adversely
affect the national defense. '6 7
While not purporting to define national security, the Supreme Court
in Sugarman v. Dougall5 discussed the type of interest which would
support a restriction of noncitizen employment. According to the Court,
citizenship would bear a rational relationship to a position whose occu-
pants participated directly in the formulation, execution or review of
broad public policy and who perform functions that go to the heart of
representative government. 9 Despite the breadth of this description, the
Court emphasized that the means of imposing any such restriction must
be narrowly drawn."
Under the Sugarman and Mow Sun Wong analyses, "national secu-
rity" emerges as the only interest of those advanced which may ade-
quately support a restriction on alien employment in the federal civil
service.7 However, President Ford's Order is neither premised on the
national security interest nor narrowly drawn. 2 It is both a device to
maintain the status quo and a request for Congress to consider the
policies and issues raised by Mow Sun Wong in order to determine
conclusively what interests, if any, support the restriction of civil service
jobs to citizens.
"citizenship may be a valid job qualification because participation in the decision-making
process of the polity is the very definition of citizenship."
67. 32 C.F.R. § 156.5(a) (1976).
68. 413 U.S. 634 (1973).
69. Id. at 647.
70. Id. at 643. The citizenship requirement for New York State police officers was
recently upheld in Foley v. Connelie, 419 F. Supp. 889 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). See notes 89-94
infra and accompanying text.
71. Sugarman is limited to prohibition of state discrimination against aliens in civil
service employment. The paramount federal power over immigration and naturalization
precluded the extension of Sugarman to the federal civil service. Exercise of that power
could give rise to national interests, not present at the state level, which justify a citizen-
ship requirement in the federal civil service. Nevertheless, Mow Sun Wong emphasized
that any such interest must be "overriding." 426 U.S. at 100-01.
72. The President's Order is not, on its face, expressly supported by any of the interests
advanced in Mow Sun Wong. See notes 6 & 7 supra. Although the President concludes
that "it is in the national interest to preserve the long-standing policy of generally prohib-
iting the employment of aliens from positions in the competitive service," nowhere in the
Executive Order or the accompanying letter does he elaborate specifically why such a
policy furthers the national interests nor what particular aspect of the national interest it
benefits. See note 8 supra and accompanying text.
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I
ALTERNATIVE CONGRESSIONAL APPROACHES
Several means are available to Congress to resolve the issues of alien
employment raised by the Supreme Court and the President. First, by
appropriate legislation Congress may simply ratify the President's total
exclusion of aliens from the federal civil service. Judicial response to
such a statute may vary, depending on whether or not Congress suffi-
ciently identified a particular national interest which required the ex-
clusion.
Mow Sun Wong emphasizes that the restriction of civil service em-
ployment to citizens must serve an overriding national interest. Al-
though the Court appears to require an identification of any supporting
interest, 3 a congressional ratification of President Ford's Order might
be upheld judicially without any further elaboration of the reasons for
excluding aliens from the federal civil service. Applying the "political
question" doctrine, ' 4 courts have repeatedly sustained congressional
power to control the entry and residence of aliens.
7 5
However, the restriction of federal civil service employment to citi-
zens may present an appropriate case for limiting the application of the
political question doctrine,' particularly where the exclusion is unjusti-
fied by an identifiable national interest. A deprivation of the rights of
aliens after they have been admitted for permanent residence does not
involve immigration and naturalization to such a degree to place it
beyond judicial cognizance.77 Additionally, aliens admitted to the
United States are protected by the Bill of Rights," including the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. Any classification of all
aliens as ineligible for federal employment requires judicial examination
under the tests of Graham and Sugarman.7 1
73. See note 48 supra and accompanying text.
74. See Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753
(1972).
75. "Policies pertaining to the entry of aliens and their right to remain here are pecu-
liarly concerned with the political conduct of government . . . . [Tihe formulation of
these policies is entrusted exclusively to Congress. . . ... Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S.
753, 766-67 (1972), citing Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 531-32 (1954).
76. See note 57 supra.
77. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
78. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
79. See notes 26-33, 68-70 supra and accompanying text. In Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S.
67 (1976), Mr. Justice Stevens asserted that a classification among aliens, as opposed to
a classification between aliens and citizens, was permissible. Id. at 78-79. The Court held
that a classification requiring permanent admission and continuous residence in the
United States for five years was valid as a condition to alien participation in the federal
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If a particular interest supporting the exclusion is identified, the re-
cent case of Examining Board of Engineers, Architects and Surveyors
v. Flores de Otero," involving local government restrictions on the em-
ployment of aliens, suggests a test which may be used by the courts in
determining the propriety of the federal exclusion of aliens from the civil
service. In this case, decided after Mow Sun Wong, the Supreme Court
invalidated Puerto Rico's statute which denied to aliens the right to
engage in the private practice of engineering. In finding that the claimed
governmental interests of preventing an influx of Spanish-speaking
alien engineers into Puerto Rico, raising the low standard of living, and
providing an assurance of financial accountability to clients of engineers
were not sufficiently compelling to justify such discrimination,8 1 the
Court nevertheless concluded:
[A] State, Territory, or local government, or certainly the Federal
Government, may ... be permitted some discretion in determining the
circumstances under which it will employ aliens or whether aliens may
receive public benefits or partake of public resources on the same basis
as citizens.82
The Court subsequently offered the following guidelines for determining
whether the exercise of governmental discretion denies aliens equal pro-
tection:
In each case, the governmental interest claimed to justify the discrimina-
tion is to be carefully examined in order to determine whether that
interest is legitimate and substantial, and inquiry must be made whether
the means adopted to achieve the goal are necessary and precisely
drawn. 3
Although Flores de Otero concerns discrimination in the private sec-
tor"4 authorized by a commonwealth, 8 such a test also provides a worka-
supplemental medical insurance program. Mathews was decided on the same day as Mow
Sun Wong.
80. 426 U.S. 572 (1976).
81. Id. at 605-06.
82. Id. at 604-05 (emphasis added).
83. Id. at 605 (emphasis added).
84. [Alliens have been restricted from engaging in private enterprises and
occupations that are otherwise lawful ....
... It is with respect to this kind of discrimination that the States have had
the greatest difficulty in persuading this Court that their interests are substantial
and constitutionally permissible, and that the discrimination is necessary for the
safeguarding of those interests.
Id. at 603.
85. Because of the unique status of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, it is unclear
whether the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment or the due process
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ble basis for evaluating federal restrictions on the public employment
of aliens. President Ford's Order, prohibiting the employment of aliens
in the name of protecting a generalized "national interest,"8 lacks even
a rational relationship between the rule and the interest served. Addi-
tionally, it fails to meet the Flores de Otero requirements of demonstrat-
ing that the claimed interest is legitimate and substantial, and that the
total exclusion of aliens from federal civil service is both a necessary and
precisely drawn means of protecting that interest. However, the courts
will generally defer to the political branches in matters of national secu-
rity."7 If either the President or Congress were to identify the national
security as a reason for excluding aliens from the civil service, that
interest would probably be sufficient to support the restriction under
either the rational relatonship test or a legitimate and substantial inter-
est test.'s
That federal courts do not hesitate to scrutinize strictly the statutory
exclusion of aliens from government employment is reflected in a recent
decision of the District Court for the Southern District of New York. In
Foley v. Connelie9 the court addressed the issue of the constitutionality
of New York's citizenship requirement for its state police officers. Since
state troopers are "officers who participate directly in the. . . execution
of broad public policy and who perform functions that go to the heart
of representative government,"9 the court found a vital and essential
relationship between citizenship and the proper performance of a state
trooper's duties and determined that it need not subject the statute to
clause of the fifth amendment protects the rights of residents of Puerto Rico. The Court
concluded that either provision applied to this case:
[I]rrespective of which Amendment applies, the statutory restriction on the
ability of aliens to engage in the otherwise lawful private practice of civil engineer-
ing is plainly unconstitutional. If the Fourteenth Amendment is applicable, the
Equal Protection Clause nullifies the statutory exclusion. If, on the other hand,
it is the Fifth Amendment and its Due Process Clause that apply, the statute's
discrimination is so egregious that it falls within the rule of Boiling v. Sharpe
426 U.S. at 601.
86. See note 8 supra and accompanying text.
87. See note 23 supra and accompanying text.
88. In Mow Sun Wong, the Court concluded that if the exclusion of aliens from the
federal civil service were mandated by the Congress or the President, there need be only
a rational relationship between the rule and the interest. 426 U.S. at 103. In Flores de
Otero, however, the Court apparently suggests that even a federal restriction on employ-
ment of aliens in the civil service should be strictly scrutinized. See notes 82-83 supra and
accompanying text. Interestingly, Mow Sun Wong was decided on June 1, 1976; Flores de
Otero on June 17, 1976.
89. 419 F. Supp. 889 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). The court relied on Sugarman, In re Griffiths,
Mow Sun Wong, and Flores de Otero in reaching its decision.
90. Id. at 895, citing Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. at 647.
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close judicial scrutiny." Yet, even under the stricter test of Sugarman,9"
the citizenship requirement was defended as serving a substantial and
compelling state interest in the maintenance of public order to effect the
preservation of the political structure. 3 In upholding the statute, the
court concluded that the restriction was sufficiently precise, and no less
drastic alternative could adequately protect the state interest."
An alternative approach to resolving the unanswered issues of Mow
Sun Wong is to define those positions which involve functions that go
to the heart of representative government" and which, therefore, should
be restricted to citizens. In order to determine which federal positions
affect the national security interest to such a degree that they should
be barred to aliens,96 Congress could create a system of job classification
and implement it using existing procedures for security clearance of
federal personnel.
Currently, the responsibility for imposing narrow and precise restric-
tions on federal employment rests with each agency head, who has the
power to designate positions as sensitive. The administrative agencies
91. 419 F. S~ipp. at 895.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 898.
94. Id. at 899. The standard of review enunciated in Foley seems even stricter than that
of Flores. See note 83 supra and accompanying text. In Foley, the court applied the
following standard:
Where a state asserts a compelling state interest to justify statutory discrimina-
tion based on a suspect classification, it must establish a very substantial state
interest; it cannot choose a means to pursue that interest which unnecessarily
burdens or restricts constitutionally protected activity; the statute must be drawn
with precision and be tailored to meet legitimate objectives; finally, if there is a
less restrictive alternative available that will adequately accomplish its purposes,
the state must employ it.
419 F. Supp. at 895.
95. Id.
96. Mow Sun Wong suggests that jobs in agencies concerned with foreign affairs, treaty
negotiations, or immigration and naturalization may sufficiently affect the national inter-
est to be barred to aliens. 426 U.S. at 114; see note 48 supra.
97. For example, consider the Department of Defense Civilian Applicant and Employ-
ment Security Program, 32 C.F.R. § 156.5(c) (1976). The regulations define a sensitive
position:
(c) Sensitive position. A "sensitive position" is any position within the De-
partment of Defense the occupant of which could bring about, by virtue of the
nature of the position, a material adverse effect on the national security. Sensitive
positions are of the following two categories:
(1) Noncritical sensitive position. Positions so designated by the au-
thority of the Head of a DoD Component, involving the following:
(i) Any position, the duties or responsibilities of which require access to
SECRET or CONFIDENTIAL defense information or material.
(ii) Any position involving education and orientation of DoD personnel.
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thus have broad discretion to establish qualifications for their employ-
ees, 8 but federal employees are afforded statutory safeguards against
unjust removal and discrimination in hiring.9
To protect both the national interest and the rights of individual
employees and applicants, many federal agencies have created elaborate
standards and security clearance procedures to distinguish sensitive
positions and determine the suitability of individuals for those jobs.,"0
(iii) Any other position so designated by authority of the Head of a DoD
Component.
(2) Critical sensitive position. Positions so designated by authority of
the Head of a DoD Component, involving the following:
(i) Access to TOP SECRET defense information or material.
(ii) Development or approval of war plans, plans, or particulars of fu-
ture major or special operations of war, or critical and extremely impor-
tant items of war.
(iii) Development or approval of plans, policies, or programs which af-
fect the overall operations of the Department of Defense or of a DoD
Component, i.e., policy-making or policy determining positions.
(iv) Investigative duties, the issuance of personnel security clearances,
or duty on personnel security boards.
(v) Fiduciary, public contact, or other duties demanding the highest
degree of public trust.
(vi) Any other position so designated by authority of the Head of a DoD
Component.
See also 5 U.S.C. § 7532 (1970) (which gives heads of agencies the power to remove or
suspend employees in the interests of national security).
98. United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 103 (1946). This decision upheld
the Hatch Act, i.e., the right of Congress to regulate political activity of public employees
and to delegate authority to the Executive branch to establish abstention from political
activity as a condition of public employment.
99. In Cole v. Young, 351 U.S. 536 (1956), the Court held that 5 U.S.C. § 7532 allows
summary removal of an employee "in the interest of national security" only where it is
clearly shown that his position is one where he could adversely affect the national security.
See also United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967) (holding that the statute making it
unlawful for a member of a Communist action organization to work in any defense facility
was unconstitutionally overbroad). See also N.Y. Times, Sept. 9, 1976, at 1, col. 5 (report-
ing that the Civil Service Commission has ordered elimination of all political loyalty
questions on the standard application for federal jobs). Federal rulings had held that the
questions were so overbroad that they encroached on the first amendment rights. See
generally Das, Discrimination in Employment Against Aliens: The Impact of the Consti-
tution and Federal Civil Rights Laws, 35 U. Prrr. L. REv. 499, 534-36 (1974).'
100. The elaborate standards and procedures of the Department of Defense are a good
example of such a set of guidelines. See note 97 supra. The Defense Department's basic
standard for employment and retention of civilian employees is "that, based on all the
available information, the employment or retention in employment of an individual is
clearly consistent with the interests of national security." 32 C.F.R. § 156.7(a) (1976). In
applying that standard, consideration is given, but not limited, to an individual's past and
current participation in a list of twenty activities and associations, including membership
in, affiliation or sympathetic association with, any foreign or domestic organization which
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Such a system, if applied impartially to aliens and citizens, provides a
reliable method for deciding from which sensitive positions aliens should
be excluded.101 However, because certain ties with foreign countries raise
presumptive doubts as to an individual's loyalty, some existing criteria
may be unfair if indiscriminately applied to aliens.' °2 In addition, sub-
stantive criteria for establishing loyalty and methods of investigation,
if applied more stringently to aliens, may result in a deprivation of
liberty without due process in contravention of the holding of Mow Sun
Wong. 10
3
If an alien is denied federal employment after a security investigation,
he should be afforded a hearing' 4 and, if unsatisfied, an opportunity to
appear in court and question whether the criteria applied were promul-
gated within the scope of the agency's authority and whether the criteria
were fairly applied to him.' 5 Any information sought in connection with
a security investigation must be "specifically, directly and narrowly"
is totalitarian, Fascist or Communist, or close association with one engaging in such
activity. 32 C.F.R. § 156.7(b) (1976). Subsection (b) further provides: "As the following
activities and associations are of varying degrees of seriousness, the ultimate determina-
tion must be made on the basis of an overall commonsense evaluation of all the informa-
tion in a particular case." In addition, Defense Department regulations provide for a
security investigation, the scope of which is to be determined by the "degree of adverse
effect the occupant of the position sought to be filled could bring about, by virtue of the
nature of the position, on the national security . . ." 32 C.F.R. § 156.8(a) (1976).
101. Where a position affects national interests, but provides a lesser risk of harm, the
standard for employment and retention may be less stringent than "clearly consistent
with the interests of national security." See note 100 supra. For example, the standard to
be used in making an advisory opinion relating to the loyalty of a United States citizen
who is an employee of, or being considered for employment in, a public international
organization of which the United States is a member is "whether or not on all the evidence
there is a reasonable doubt as to the loyalty of the person involved to the Government of
the United States." 5 C.F.R. § 1501.8(a) (1976). The Postal Service regulations allow
noncitizens who have been accorded permanent resident status to hold all Postal Service
positions except those of a high executive level or those expressly designated as sensitive.
426 U.S. at 98 n.13; see note 34 supra.
102. Some of the criteria listed in 32 C.F.R. § 156.7(b) (1976), note 100 supra, could be
unfair if applied to an alien without full consideration of his individual situation. For
example, item 15, the presence of a close friend or relative in a nation whose interests may
be inimical to those of the United States, should not be a sufficient basis for excluding
an alien from a civil service position without a showing of the relationship of this circum-
stance to a specific risk to American interests.
103. 426 U.S. at 116-17. See 85 HARv. L. REv. 1130, 1169-77 (1976).
104. See, for example, the hearing procedures outlined in the Department of Defense
Civilian Applicant and Security Clearance Program. 32 C.F.R. § 156.9(e) (1976).
105. Usually administrative remedies must be exhausted before judicial relief will be
granted. See Leiner v. Rossell, 121 F. Supp. 27 (S.D.N.Y. 1954). However, suspension on
security grounds may constitute action which is "clearly illegal" and may entitle the
employee to judicial relief without exhausting his administrative remedies.
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related to performance of the employee's official duties.' 6 While reluc-
tant to disturb federal administrative decisions concerning aliens where
national security interests are involved,'0 or where the discrimination
alleged is among aliens and not between aliens and citizens,' 8 the courts
will examine the exercise of power imposing employment qualifications
if that exercise arguably violates due process.' 9
The future action of Congress, whether acquiescence to the Presiden-
tial decision to exclude aliens completely from the civil service, or im-
plementation of a classification system which will permit exceptions to
President Ford's Order, will have an important effect on the allocation
of federal responsibility for alien affairs. If Congress ratifies President
Ford's Order, it will relinquish further its control over immigration and
naturalization and federal personnel to the Executive. In addition, such
a decision would reaffirm the power of the political branches of govern-
ment to regulate alien affairs and national security even when the exer-
cise of that power conflicts with judicial protection of individual rights.
Externally, the congressional decision may have a major impact on the
decision of aliens, both visitors and residents, to seek permanent resi-
dence and citizenship in the United States."'
IV
RECOMMENDATIONS
The need for loyal employees in sensitive positions appears suffi-
ciently compelling to justify a decision to exclude aliens from those jobs
which do affect the national security interest. Furthermore, although
the lack of a uniform definition of national security poses a considerable
problem for purposes of deciding which positions should be restricted to
citizens, the problem is not insurmountable. Yet, while providing the
benefit of certainty, an express definition of national security by Con-
gress, the President, or the Supreme Court would not resolve the issue
of job classification, protect alien rights, or guarantee American secu-
rity. When the national security interest has clashed with individual
106. See Uniformed Sanitation Men v. Commissioner of Sanitation, 392 U.S. 280, 284
(1968).
107. Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 766 (1972).
108. Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 78-79 (1976).
109. Cole v. Young, 351 U.S. 536 (1956); Cafeteria Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S.
886 (1961).
110. Cf. notes 54 & 62 supra. If Congress adopts the Presidential exclusion without
identifying the supporting national interest, there is a danger that a broad power, exer-
cised in the "national interest," may operate as a disguised exclusion of aliens from federal
jobs for a variety of economic, political, and nationalistic reasons.
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liberties, the courts have tried to give maximum protection to each with,
a minimum sacrifice of the opposing interest."' A rigidly defined con-
cept of national security would not accurately reflect changing security
needs and would only operate to the detriment of individual liberties." 2
Moreover, because of the dynamic nature of foreign affairs, a fixed defi-
nition of national security may overly restrict the Executive and render
him less capable of responding adequately to international crises."' Fi-
nally, any definition should be sufficiently flexible to enable each ad-
ministrative agency to apply it to positions within its ranks and deter-
mine which jobs affect the security interest which that agency is charged
with protecting.
While lacking the precision provided by an express definition, a broad
statement of national security may be useful in determining whether,
as President Ford believed,"4 the national interest justifies the policy of
denying aliens equal access to federal employment. The major factor in
determining whether a particular position, or all federal positions,
should be reserved to citizens should be the policy-making impact of the
job as measured by the potential influence of its occupant on the pro-
ductive strength of the United States, particularly in the areas of de-
fense, foreign policy, and internal security. If an alien employee's ties
to his native country may influence his policy decisions to the detriment
of American strength, then such a job should be barred to him or re-
stricted to citizens."5
If the test of policy-making impact is applied to civil service jobs, not
every position will be deemed sensitive for national security purposes,
even if occupied by one whose interests may be inimical to the United
States, since the vast majority of civil service jobs involve policy execu-
tion rather than decision making."' Although such execution, if incon-
111. K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT 189 (3d ed. 1972).
112. See 85 HARv. L. REv. 1130, 1134 (1972).
113. The judiciary has not yet decided whether special circumstances, such as armed
hostilities between the United States and the country of which the alien is a citizen, wouldjustify the use of a classification based on alienage. In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 722 n.
11 (1973). However, in Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976), the Court asserted:
Any rule of constitutional law that would inhibit the flexibility of the political
branches of government to respond to changing world conditions should be
adopted only with the greatest caution.
426 U.S. at 81.
114. Letter from the President, note 8 supra and accompanying text.
115. The decision whether to employ an individual alien should be founded upon an
overall factual determination, based on the sensitivity of the particular position. Decisions
to bar aliens completely from a federal position should be supported by a very strong
showing of the adverse effect to be exerted on the national security by an alien occupant
of that position. See notes 100 & 101 supra.
116. In his dissenting opinion in Foley v. Connelie, 419 F. Supp. 889 (S.D.N.Y. 1976),
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sistent with policy goals and directives, may have a harmful effect on
national security, the performance of most federal employees in imple-
menting policy decisions is subject to review and disciplinary action
which will reduce the damage caused by one person's improper acts.",
Since the administrative agencies specifically responsible for the in-
terests of national security can best apply the policy-making impact test
to the positions within their departments, a further delegation of con-
gressional authority over alien affairs to those agencies seems an appro-
priate method of deciding which federal jobs should be barred to al-
iens. ' 'I These decisions should be made by the agency head, who should
strive to protect both the national interest and the equal employment
opportunities of aliens, within the restrictions imposed by national secu-
rity.
A job within an agency which is not primarily concerned with national
security interests may nevertheless be sensitive and thus reserved to
citizens if that particular position affects national security. Such a de-
Judge Mansfield declared that the class of positions where citizenship bears a rational
relationship to its special demands is clearly a narrow one. 419 F. Supp. at 901. He did
not believe that the position of state trooper, which involved application of settled law
rather than the formulation of new law or policy, was such a position. 419 F. Supp. at
902.
117. See, e.g., regulations of the Department of State, Ethical and Other Conduct and
Responsibilities of Employees, 22 C.F.R. § 10.735-305(d) (1976):
A special Government employee shall avoid any action ... which might result
in, or create the appearance of:
(1) Using public office for private gain;
(2) Giving preferential treatment to any person;
(3) Impeding Government efficiency or economy;
(4) Losing independence or impartiality;
(5) Making a Government decision outside official channels; or
(6) Affecting adversely the confidence of the public in the integrity of
the Government.
22 C.F.R. § 10.735-105 (1976) provides:
A violation of the regulations in this part by an employee or special Government
employee may be cause for appropriate disciplinary action which may be in addi-
tion to any penalty prescribed by law.
22 C.F.R. § 9.62 (1976) contains procedures for enforcing security violations and 22 C.F.R.
§ 9.63 (1976) provides for disciplinary action for security violations.
118. The delegation of discretionary congressional authority over alien affairs to admin-
istrative agencies is not unprecedented. The Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1201 (1976) provides that a consular officer may issue a visa in his discretion. 8 U.S.C.
§ 1203 (1976) specifies that aliens who have been lawfully admitted for permanent resi-
dence and want to leave the country are entitled to a re-entry permit at the discretion of
the Attorney General. In general, an alien who seeks permanent residence must satisfy
both the statutory requirements for admission as an immigrant and obtain a favorable
exercise of discretion from the Attorney General or his delegate. K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW AND GOVERNMENT 236-37 (2d ed. 1975).
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termination should be made by the head of the agency, and reviewed
by the chief officer of the agency which has specific authority to deal
with that interest.
In addition, under this proposal some sensitive positions could be held
by aliens if they met certain security clearance requirements."9 The
substantive and procedural standards to determine eligibility for em-
ployment should vary with the sensitivity of the job, and applicants
should be given maximum procedural safeguards without jeopardizing
the security program.' 20 Alien as well as citizen applicants who are
denied employment after an impartial investigation should be provided
with reasons for their rejection and full opportunity for appeal, unless
such disclosure would endanger national security.' 2'
Regardless of the apparent care and impartiality involved in decisions
to exclude aliens from employment, judicial review of such decisions is
necessary to balance the right of an alien to seek employment against
the compelling national interests which would deny him that employ-
ment. Rather than attempt a further definition of those national inter-
ests,' 22 the court review should include:
119. The Department of Defense subdivides sensitive jobs into "noncritical sensitive
positions" and "critical sensitive positions," with more severe investigative procedures
required for appointment to the latter. See notes 97 & 100 supra. In addition, the incum-
bent of every sensitive position is subject to reinvestigation every five years. 32 C.F.R. §
156.8(a)(4) (1976). Such an approach would function well in determining alien eligibility
for various strata of sensitive positions.
120. Parker v. Lester, 112 F. Supp. 433, 443 (N.D. Cal.), rev'd on other grounds, 227
F.2d 708 (9th Cir. 1955). The district court concluded that seamen were entitled to a
hearing before being rejected for employment for security reasons.
121. See the dissent in Cafeteria Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 901-02
(1961), which voiced disagreement with the majority view that a discharge of a cook for
security reasons would not, in law or in fact, prevent her from obtaining other federal
employment:
[Rejection from a job for security reasons] is far more likely to be taken as an
accusation of communism or disloyalty than imputation of some small personal
fault .... [T]he Government ... ought not to affix a "badge of infamy" ...
to a person without some statement of charges, and some opportunity to speak
in reply.
Current policy is to give employees who have been suspended for security reasons a
summary of the reasons for the action, to the extent national security will permit. See,
e.g., 32 C.F.R. § 156.9(e)(5) (1976).
122. In addition to those discussed in Foley v. Connelie, notes 89-94 supra and accom-
panying text, the courts have identified other compelling interests to justify discrimina-
tion between aliens and citizens. In United States v. Gordon-Nikkar, 518 F.2d 972, 976
(5th Cir. 1975), the court held that the federal government had a compelling interest in
insuring that jurors were personally committed to the proper application and enforcement
of United States laws, and therefore was justified in excluding aliens from jury service.
Similarly, in Perkins v. Smith, 370 F. Supp. 134, 137 (D. Md.), afl'd, 426 U.S. 913 (1976),
19771
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(1) whether an agency actually has responsibility for the inter-
est it purports to protect by the exclusion of aliens;
(2) whether an agency has adequately examined the policy-
making importance of the job and its potential effect on the pro-
tected national interest before deciding that an alien should be
denied access to that position;
(3) whether, in the case of a job which is sensitive but may be
open to some aliens, the agency has formulated criteria rationally
designed to serve the protected interest, and whether the criteria
were properly applied to the individual alien; and
(4) whether the agency provides strict procedural safeguards for
notice, fair hearing and appeal for both aliens and citizens.'"
The foregoing procedures are more consistent with the policies set
forth in Mow Sun Wong than President Ford's complete exclusion of
aliens from employment in the federal civil service. The retention of a
broad definition of national security insures that decisions involving the
national security interest will remain in the hands of the political
branches of government. Furthermore, the requirement that an admin-
istrative decision to exclude an alien from employment be adequately
documented, and the additional requirement that an agency which does
not deal with matters of national security have such decision reviewed
by an agency which does, insures that the decision to deprive an alien
of an important liberty will be justified by reasons that are properly the
concern of that agency. 2 4 Finally, judicial review will insure that indi-
vidual rights as well as the national security are thoroughly considered
in any decision which restricts the equal employment opportunities of
aliens.
CONCLUSION
The decision of Mow Sun Wong, removing restrictions on alien em-
ployment in the civil service unless justified by a supreme national
interest,'2 mandates a determination of the compelling interests which
allow a citizenship restriction, and the establishment of fair administra-
tive procedures to implement any restriction. President Ford's subse-
the court, citing Sugarman, concluded that the jury is at the heart of our system of
government and the exclusion of aliens from jury service did not constitute a denial of
equal protection.
123. Judicial review of administrative decisions does not include a review of the merits
of the decision, but may include a review of the substantiality of the evidence. See W.
GELLHORN & C. BYsE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES AND COMMENTS 387-88, 405-06 (6th ed.
1974).
124. 426 U.S. at 114-15.
125. Id. at 116.
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quent decision to continue the restriction on alien employment satisfies
none of these requirements. Rather, it maintains the current exclusion
pending an appropriate congressional determination of its efficacy.
Of the interests suggested as overriding in Mow Sun Wong, the need
for loyalty appears sufficiently compelling to exclude aliens from sensi-
tive positions. The analysis of Mow Sun Wong and related law supports
the conclusion that only those agencies concerned with interests affect-
ing the national security, i.e. national defense, alien affairs, and foreign
policy, can exclude aliens from the positions which clearly affect those
interests, and the exclusion must be administered under proper proce-
dural protection.
The failure to establish a method for determining alien eligibility for
federal jobs or to elaborate upon the Presidential decision will prevent
the implementation of the policies of Mow Sun Wong. While there is
substantial danger to the national security if all barriers to employment,
even for sensitive positions, are removed, President Ford's broad exclu-
sion unduly infringes the rights of aliens. If adopted by Congress, the
suggested procedures will maintain the separate interests of each
branch in the national security while protecting the freedom of aliens
to pursue employment with the federal government. In addition to
accommodating the competing policy interests, the proposed guidelines
provide a basis for evaluating the potential impact of the Mow Sun
Wong issue on national policies of immigration, naturalization, and
foreign affairs.
Monica A. Otte
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